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Approaching the problem of defining 
'health' and 'disease' 
from the perspectives of 
evolutionary psychology and Darwinian 
medicine 
  
Presented at the joint symposium of the Society for the 
Study of Human Biology and the Human Biological 
Association 
The Changing face of Disease: Implications for Society 
Cambridge 17th-18th September 2001 
  
Abstract 
  
Concepts of 'health' and 'disease' are of fundamental importance to 
ethical considerations regarding medical provision. Yet the terms have 
no clearly agreed definitions. In fact, the difficulty of defining health 
has led to most attention being given to defining disease instead. 
Here, two schools of thought have arisen: the 'naturalist' which argues 
that disease is an objective entity in itself and the 'normativist' which 
gives emphasis to the subjective nature of disease experience differing 
between cultures and through history. Respectively, these two schools 
characterize quantitative (or functional) and qualitative (or evaluative) 
views of disease. Although both schools offer important insights, they 
are essentially at odds. This poster outlines an approach that seeks to 
find a basis for a meeting (if not a unification) of these schools by 
adopting ideas and approaches from evolutionary psychology and 
Darwinian medicine. 
  
From the perspective of reproductive fitness, the question of whether 
health and disease can be said to exist as biological entities is 
addressed and the idea that all that matters is reproductivity is 
considered. It is suggested that attitudes regarding certain biological 
entities, such as physical or physiological states, serve adaptive 
functions. The suggestion is then made that, although open to social 
and cultural influence, attitudes towards and qualitative definitions of 
health and disease also have biological bases. Thus, it may be argued 
that evaluative definitions of disease have functional (evolutionary) 
bases, thereby linking the naturalist and normativist schools of 
thought. Important in this linkage, however, is acceptance of ideas 
from evolutionary psychology. 
  
The only discipline that currently unites the study of health and 
disease with that of evolutionary biology (including evolutionary 
psychology) is Darwinian medicine. It is within this discipline that new 
theoretical and evidence-based understanding of 'health' and 'disease' 
is likely to prove fruitful – in particular, in giving 'health' appropriately 
weighted attention. 
  
  
Note 
  
This poster is a brief report on work in progress. The account given 
here is brief and incomplete and represents food for thought rather 
than a thorough argument. It presents some ideas sketched out in a 
fairly general way without providing any concrete conclusions. (It is by 
no means clear, as yet, that some lines of argument may not, in fact, 
be tautologies.) As a result, further ideas and constructive comments 
from colleagues are most welcome. 
  
  
  
Introduction 
  
The approach taken by modern medicine has often been criticised as 
being too disease-orientated. This is unsurprising since traditionally 
the majority of those with access to medical care do not call upon it 
unless they feel compelled to do so. This compulsion arises due to the 
experience of some form of illness1. Otherwise, life is lived, as René 
Leriche (see Canguilhem) suggested, 'in the silence of the organs' and 
no recourse to remedy is deemed necessary. The modern ideal of a 
transition to a more health-orientated outlook is not easy and the 
success of such a venture is, so far, questionable. With the exception 
of advice concerning certain 'life style' practices2, medical services are 
limited in what they can do to enhance an individual's well being3. It 
may be that much of the re-orientation to a health, as opposed to a 
disease, focus is little more than the old disease focus in a new guise. 
  
To be health-orientated, however, requires an understanding of what 
health is. But attaining a definition of health has proved extremely 
problematic. There is a tacit assumption by many that a state of health 
is one where there is no experience of disease. This does not meet 
with universal approval but the philosopher Christopher Boorse has 
suggested that beginning with a definition of disease is a legitimate 
approach to the problem of defining health as the absence of disease. 
Such an approach is often described as 'naturalist' (or sometimes 
'descriptivist')4. It holds that the notion of disease can be defined in 
value-free terms relating to normal physical function and statistical 
averages. An alternative view suggests that disease is a matter of the 
evaluation of experience – in effect, that a disease is what we agree it 
to be. Here, what constitutes and is defined as disease is more 
variable depending upon the vagaries of culture and historical period. 
This approach is often described as 'normativist' (or sometimes 
'evaluative')5. The division between these schools of thought is 
approximately along the lines of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, respectively. 
  
Currently, there appear to be objections to the 'naturalist' approach 
which its adherents cannot satisfactorily address – not least the issue 
of what constitutes an average or normal state of human function. On 
balance, the arguments at present seem to favour those of the 
'normativists' (see, for example, the appraisal given by Reznek). 
However, the sympathies of quantitatively-orientated scientists and, it 
seems, some in the medical profession, lean more towards the 
'naturalist' approach. Both schools of thought acknowledge the 
existence of organic disease but it is the 'naturalist' bias that seems to 
suit those who want to define disease entirely in relation to organic 
phenomena. The differences are such that reconciling the two 
approaches appears to be currently impossible – unless perhaps novel 
and so far unexplored avenues can shed new light on the argument. 
  
Darwinian medicine and the problem of disease 
  
One of the most novel and striking statements to come out of 
Darwinian medicine has been the suggestion that illness can, in fact, 
be beneficial to the ultimate well being of the individual. The 
manifestations of a disease are frequently those of a body trying to 
protect itself. Indeed, many such manifestations are not disease-
specific in that the same responses are made to a wide range of 
harmful agents. Reviews of Nesse and Williams' popular text 'Sickness 
and Healing' have sported headlines such as 'Sickness can be good for 
you'. A fever, for example, may be an unpleasant characteristic of an 
infection but, from the perspective of Darwinian medicine, it is seen as 
representing a response by the body to defend itself by raising its 
temperature to a level which the infectious agent finds less tolerable. 
To block a rise in body temperature in such circumstances has been 
found to prolong illness. Similarly, morning sickness during pregnancy 
is unpleasant but it has been suggested that it may serve to eliminate 
from the mother toxins that might harm the developing foetus. To 
block this reaction may make the experience more bearable but may 
at the same time, lead to foetal harm. Thus, to a dispassionate 
observer, if not to the sufferer, the manifestation normally referred to 
as 'illness' can be seen to have positive connotations. 
  
If being unwell can be of ultimate benefit to an organism, Darwinian 
medicine is, therefore, calling into question the use of experience and 
associated values as guides to what disease really is. As a result, it 
seems to be at odds with the 'normativist' approach to disease 
definition. This is not to suggest that that approach is completely 
discredited or refuted at a stroke but it does suggest that it cannot be 
taken to give a wholly definitive account. 
  
Evolutionary Psychology and the problem of disease 
  
Evolutionary psychology, although criticized for explaining behaviour 
simply in terms of genes and reproductive success (see for example 
Rose and Rose's collection 'Alas Poor Darwin'), nevertheless poses 
pertinent questions. One needs to ask where our values come from – 
in particular those values pertaining to attitudes and responses to 
illness. 'Normativist' accounts of disease do not seem to spend much 
time addressing this question. Instead, it appears to be largely 
accepted that, since they vary between cultures, they are a social 
product. 
  
That there are cultural and temporal differences in disease attribution 
is indeed true but what may be overlooked is that there are certain 
attitudes or values associated with health and disease that are shared 
by all societies and have been present throughout history - values that 
because of their ubiquity may be more important to focus upon. For 
example, the desires to avoid becoming ill and to avoid death for as 
long as possible are not simply fads or fashions although the way of 
achieving those ends certainly are. The desire for personal 
preservation is more than the product of a value system: it is a 
biological imperative. Self-preservation is a fundamental factor in 
reproductive fitness – and, perhaps, one that is not given sufficient 
attention. Without an innate tendency towards staying alive (at least 
until it has copulated), no organism can ever hope to reproduce. 
  
If one considers the notion of 'disgust', cross-cultural studies of what 
different groups consider disgusting show a number of similarities 
between those groups. It appears that things potentially hazardous to 
health rank quite high. There is no single simple answer as to why this 
should be. One could propose that systems of information exchange 
down the generations pass on important disease-avoiding practices 
inculcating a set of 'disgust' values directed at self-preservation. There 
would be truth in this - although humans are well known for departing 
from the values expounded by their forebears. That aside, it would not 
be an entirely convincing argument. One has only to ask what might 
happen should this exchange of information break down and 
knowledge about hygienic practices not be passed on. One suspects 
that what one's ancestors found disgusting but were unable to tell 
their descendents about would still be treated with much the same 
degree of caution. One suspects that much of what is now held in 
contempt would continue to be so. 
  
An innate component to the attribution of 'disgust' to certain things 
has benefits for individual survival and reproduction. It is suggested 
here that there may be some element of this in our attitudes to illness 
and disease. Finding illness an unpleasant experience causes a 
redirection of one's immediate goals to the removal of those 
experiences and a restoration of 'the silence of the organs'. Finding 
other people's illnesses objectionable may cause one to avoid those 
people and, in so doing, reduce the risk of acquiring that illness (if 
infectious). All such responses have a survival advantage. For human 
beings, there is ultimately an element of conscious decision in the 
extent to which one allows oneself to be influenced by these attitudes 
and in what might be considered to be a disease6 but, importantly, it is 
also quite probable that innate factors directed at self-preservation are 
active too. If so, then it may be suggested that values associated with 
'normative' definitions of disease are a reflection of innate factors 
promoting self-preservation and, as a result, potential reproductive 
success. Thus, fundamental to 'normativism' is, in fact, a mechanism 
that can help preserve the physical integrity of the individual and the 
continuity of the species. 
  
To summarize the position so far – it has been noted that defining 
health is so problematic that defining disease first and viewing 'health' 
as its absence has proved an appealing way out of an impasse. Those 
that adopt this approach tend to present ideas that quantitative 
scientists would tend to favour. However, a currently more persuasive 
approach to the problem sees disease as an evaluated notion changing 
with time and place. It is necessary to question where values 
originate, whether they are purely products of social factors or 
whether more fundamental and innate factors are at work. It is 
suggested that innate factors may be more influential than some may 
realize. Since, as Darwinian medicine suggests, not all aspects of 
illness are necessarily bad, many of the body's responses to what is 
called illness are in fact physiological responses that can have ultimate 
advantage. In addition, attitudes to illness and, in particular, its 
avoidance are also advantageous to self-preservation and, as a 
consequence, reproduction. It is proposed here that what is 
fundamental to a system of values affecting responses to illness has 
survival advantage in that it seeks to maintain normal organic function 
by avoidance of what may be injurious. Darwinian medicine points out 
that often what we dis-value about illness may be potentially helpful to 
restoring the function of the organism – if one makes the appropriate 
response. Studies from evolutionary psychology suggest that finding 
certain things disgusting, including other peoples' illnesses and 
avoiding these, confers survival benefits to the individual. Thus, 
concerning the question of what constitutes disease, Darwinian 
medicine and evolutionary psychology both raise interesting and 
important points about the suggestion that it is primarily a matter of 
evaluation. 
  
There is here a certain linkage between the 'naturalist' and 
'normativist' approaches to defining 'disease'. That is, normal 
biological function7, when compromised, produces experiences8, 
responses to which are usually directed at returning the organism to 
normal. In humans, this basic interplay has been elaborated and 
intellectualised so that it now includes a range of conditions not 
directly related to survival. 
  
One of the problems for the 'naturalists' has been how to define 
normal biological function. Resort to statistical notions has been 
proposed but has not proved to be thoroughly convincing. There may 
be an argument to suggest that the body's norms are those 
physiological parameters which, when departed from, elicit 
experiences one is compelled to respond to in some way. The body, in 
effect, defines its own norms and working parameters within the 
context of its basic design. In addition, these norms and working 
parameters need not be fixed but may be influenced by factors such as 
age, training and interaction with the environment. Resort to 
population averages as a means of defining standards against which to 
define an individual's disease state may not, therefore, be entirely 
appropriate. 
  
The 'naturalist' and 'normativist' approaches are both focused on 
humans. Both make credible statements yet are essentially at odds. It 
is not the aim of this study to find a means of merging the 'naturalist' 
and 'normativist' approaches but rather to see if there is common 
ground that can be further explored. This there appears to be. 
  
  
Notes 
1 The term 'illness' is here used is distinct from 'disease'. The former relates to 
physical and mental experience whereas the latter relates to independently 
diagnosable phenomena. 
2 Practices such as smoking, overeating, consumption of too much alcohol, unsafe 
sex, etc. are known to be potentially hazardous because of their correlation with 
specific undesirable end results i.e. their ultimate effects not any notion of their 
disparity with optimal function. 
3 'Well being' is used as a general term throughout to avoid lapsing into the normally 
rather loose use of the term 'health'. 
4 Other terms have also been applied. 
5 Other terms have also been applied. 
6 The situation is more complicated than this. It would appear that as society and 
medical technology have progressed, an increasing number of lesser conditions have 
achieved disease status. 
7 This is of key importance to the 'naturalist' approach. 
8 These experiences may then be evaluated. This is of key importance to the 
'normativist' approach. 
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